





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POLICY  
FORUM

# CPH & GAC

ICANN81

11 November 2024




**ICANN | RrSG**  
Registrar Stakeholder Group




# Welcome & Overview

Nico Caballero (GAC Chair)  
Ashley Heineman (RrSG Chair)  
Sam Demetriou (RySG Chair)




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# Meeting Agenda




**Session: 15:00 - 16:00**

No.	Topic	Lead
1	Welcome & Overview	CPH & GAC Chairs
2	Registration Data Accuracy	Ashley Heineman (RrSG Chair)
3	Next Round of new gTLDs: Engaging with Applicants	Sam Demetriou (RySG Chair) & Beth Bacon (RySG Vice Chair of Policy)
4	ICANN's Ethics Policy	Ashley Heineman (RrSG Chair) & Sam Demetriou (RySG Chair)
5	Wrap-Up (5 mins)	CPH & GAC Chairs




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# Registration Data Accuracy

Ashley Heineman (RrSG Chair)



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# What is Registration Data Accuracy?



## Syntactical accuracy

To be considered “syntactically accurate”, the **validation** requirements of the [Whois Accuracy Program Specification](#) Sections 1b-d must be met.



E.g., for email addresses all characters must be permissible, the “@” symbol is required, and there must be characters before the “@” symbol.



## Operational accuracy

To be considered “operationally” accurate”, the **verification** requirements of the [Whois Accuracy Program Specification](#) Section f must be met.

E.g., an email sent to the Registered Name Holder must receive an affirmative response.





# RAA

The [Registrar Accreditation Agreement](#) (RAA) provides requirements for the registration agreement that domain owners enter into with their domain registrar, including specific requirements relating to domain name registration data.

**Domain owners are obligated to provide accurate and reliable contact details to the registrar, and update their contact info within 7 days of any change.**

This includes the domain owner's name, email address, phone number, and postal address.



**If the domain owner purposely provides inaccurate or unreliable information, or does not update their data within 7 days of any change, or does not respond to verification requests within 15 days, then the domain must be suspended or canceled.**



# WAPS

The [Whois Accuracy Program Specification](#) (WAPS) of the RAA provides detailed requirements for **validating** and **verifying** the accuracy of domain name registration data, and for disabling domain names when the data is not validated and verified within 15 days of being first provided or updated.

**If a domain's data is not validated** (*all required info is provided; data is in the correct format for the field*) **and verified** (*affirmative response from the point of contact, such as following a link to a website*) **within the required timeframe, then the domain is suspended and any related services will not function until that validation and verification are complete.**





# RNAP

The [Restored Names Accuracy Policy](#) sets requirements for registration data updates in cases where a domain was deleted due to inaccuracy and is now being restored.

The policy is:

“When a registrar restores a name (from the redemption grace period) that had been deleted on the basis of submission of false contact data or non-response to registrar inquiries, the name must be placed on Registrar Hold status until the registrant has provided updated and accurate Whois information.”







# WDRP



The [Whois Data Reminder Policy](#) requires registrars to **show domain owners their registration data and remind the registrant that they are required to provide accurate data.**

The policy is:

“At least annually, a registrar must present to the registrant the current Whois information, and remind the registrant that provision of false Whois information can be grounds for cancellation of their domain name registration. Registrants must review their Whois data, and make any corrections.”



# Why Accuracy is important



Maintaining accurate and up-to-date domain name registration data allows registrars to:


- ★ Meet legal, contractual, and policy obligations
- ★ Send important mandatory notices to the domain owner, such as renewal reminders
- ★ Contact the domain owner when problems arise, such as a compromised domain being used for DNS Abuse

Ensuring that registration data is accurate protects registrants from:

- ★ Identity theft
- ★ Financial fraud



# What do registrars do already?



## Validate and Verify

Registrars must **validate and verify registration data** as described in the [Whois Accuracy Program Specification](#).

This process is triggered by specific changes to a domain name including new registration, transfer to a new registrar, or change to the registered name holder.

If the data is not verified within a limited period of time, use of the domain is suspended until the verification is complete.

For **validation**, the registrar must ensure that **all required fields are populated and that data matches required publicly-available formatting standards**; for **verification**, the registrar must **contact the domain owner by email or telephone and receive an affirmative response**.


This process allows the registrar to ensure that **all required data has been collected**, and to confirm that the **provided data is accurate, reliable, and up-to-date**.

### Scorecard:

- ✓ Global scope
- ✓ Cost-effective
- ✓ Reliable

**Total: 3/3**

# What do registrars do already?



## Above and beyond: Additional Verification

Additional verification of the accuracy of provided registration data can be supported by developing accuracy dashboards and tools that leverage open source databases and APIs.

These tools can help confirm if a postal code matches the city or has the right format, or whether a street number actually exists on the street.

Family and given names can be checked if they match a certain syntax and length, and to ensure they do not contain words such as "Hostmaster" or "Domain Admin" which typically are not family names.

This is complicated by potentially confusing names, such as the surname "Contractor" (*this is a real-life example!*) For businesses, there are likely public databases to confirm their validity.

This is further complicated by the requirement that data processing have a legal basis; if the registrar cannot demonstrate a purpose for this additional validation they may not be able to do it.

### Scorecard:



Global scope



Cost-effective



Reliable

**Total: 2/3**

# What else could registrars do?

## Address validation services




One potential method to confirm registrant information is through **address validation using third party services**. These are frequently used by shipping companies (e.g. FedEx) or ecommerce sites (e.g. Amazon).

While these services can provide accurate data, they are **limited to the countries in which the companies which own them operate**; they do not provide global coverage.

The consumer typically pays a shipping fee which includes an element of cost-recovery for these systems; they are **not otherwise cost-effective**.

Because a functional delivery address is the most important component of an order for such companies (after payment), they can invest significant resources into developing these systems and so the validation **tends to be reliable where it is available**.

### Scorecard:

-  Global scope
  -  Cost-effective
  -  Reliable
- Total: 1.5/3**

# What else could registrars do?

## ● ● Online mapping services

● ● Another potential method to confirm accuracy is online mapping services such as Google Maps.

● ● As with the other third party services, Google Maps is **not globally comprehensive, nor is it authoritative**, as addresses may appear within its database despite not being valid postal mail addresses.

● ● Correcting those invalid addresses can be extremely difficult to achieve, resulting in unreliable service overall.

### Scorecard:

- ✗ Global scope
- ? Cost-effective
- ✗ Reliable

Total: 0.5/3

# What else could registrars do?



## Postal Service verification

Some postal services provide address verification systems. Since this is **not offered by all postal services worldwide**, and there is no centralized API, any registrar intending to use a postal service system would need to dedicate significant software development to integrate with each different postal service's API.

Even if a postal address verification system confirms that the address is valid, this type of check **cannot confirm whether the person claiming the postal address is actually contactable at that address**. This would instead require additional verification, such as sending postal mail addressed to them or visiting in person and performing some type of confirmation process, which adds potentially **significant financial cost**, and causes significant and unnecessary delays in the use of the domain.


The [UPU review of postal addresses during the Whois ARS](#) found that 99% of postal addresses sampled had deliverable addresses, suggesting that postal address inaccuracy in registration data is not a problem in need of a solution.

### Scorecard:


-  Global scope
-  Cost-effective
-  Reliable

**Total: 0/3**

# What about ID verification?




Identity verification based on government-issued identification documents is difficult in part due to the high complexity and sophistication required to accurately validate the identity, and in part due to concerns around accessibility, equity, and legality.





# What about ID verification?




## Cost-effectiveness of identity document review

There is significant diversity of types of worldwide identification documents, and so registrars typically require the services of third-party vendors to verify these documents.


This brings new costs, which if conducted for all registered domains would significantly impact pricing. **In 2021, [ICANN estimated](#) that identity verification on a global scale would cost \$10 to \$20 USD per review.** While less-expensive identity verification services may exist, these do not offer global coverage.

## Liability of the approver

There is also a liability concern: **if the validation is completed incorrectly then either a genuine registrant was denied their domain name or a false document was used to complete the verification**, either way a problem. There may also be deleterious effects on the initial holder of the identity document, if it was stolen and used to register a domain which itself is used for illegal activity.



# What about ID verification?



## Accessibility, equity, and legal concerns

Not everyone has identification documents; **requiring the display of identification documents disproportionately adversely affects marginalized communities** who lack government-issued identification.


**Registrars should not evaluate the legitimacy of identification documents.** There is no scalable way for support staff to know the requirements of each type of identity document worldwide, and incorrect conclusions may create legal liabilities, especially with AI-generated documentation that is impossible to discern from real documents. Some identification documents are not permitted to be used for other purposes (such as validating the identity of the holder for an online purchase), but the domain owner may not know that or may feel they must choose between following that law or registering a domain name.

Further, **reviewing identity documentation is a data processing activity which goes well beyond the minimum required to offer the service**; it is certainly possible to register a domain without sharing one's identity documentation. This can bring the registrar into conflict with legal obligations for data minimization.

**Validating identity documents from only some (but not all) jurisdictions could also result in bad actors purposely using documentation from non-validated locations.** This means that honest registrants are faced with excessive and unnecessary data processing while dishonest abusers of the system go uncaught, having found a workaround to even the most stringent identity validation process.



# Will it affect DNS Abuse?




There are some specific ccTLDs that require identity verification; those are associated with countries which use **unified identity documentation for the entire country**.

Even with verification processes in place, there is **no clear evidence that these verification systems are effective at preventing abuse**; TLDs with these requirements, even those that are fully verified, often appear on “Top 10 Most Abused TLD” lists.

There is, however, emerging evidence that these identity document verification systems can be circumvented through the purchase of false verifications or documentation.



**In the absence of evidence demonstrating either a problem with the accuracy of existing registration data or a benefit (such as disrupting or mitigating DNS Abuse) gained through additional validation and verification processes, these drawbacks have led to registrars not adopting these identity verification services.**







## **CPH Question to GAC:**


What problems or issues are GAC members and their respective governments seeing which improving the accuracy of domain name registration data could help to resolve or remediate?





# Next Round of new gTLDs: Engaging with Applicants



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




## **CPH Question to GAC:**


How is the GAC planning to engage with new gTLD applicants in the next round? What, if any, plans has the GAC made for reviewing applications and interacting with applicants?






# ICANN's Ethics Policy


Ashley Heineman (RrSG Chair)  
Sam Demetriou (RySG Chair)





# Wrap-up

Nico Caballero (GAC Chair)  
Ashley Heineman (RrSG Chair)  
Sam Demetriou (RySG Chair)







# Thanks!

Do you have any questions?

